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1 Introduction
In the last decades changes in patent law, a growing number of knowledge
based enterprises and the rise of new technologies have led to the appraisal of
patents as necessary and sufficient instruments to appropriate the returns of
investments in research. But the rise of this pro patent era (Arundel (2001))
is opposed by strong empirical evidence based on various innovation surveys.1
These surveys consistently find that manufacturing firms rate secrecy higher
than patents as appropriation mechanism for product and process research
and development (R&D). The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy
for appropriation was explicitly analyzed by Arundel (2001) with data from
the 1993 European Community Innovation Survey (CIS). His findings sup-
port other surveys that consider various appropriation mechanisms of R&D:
a higher percentage of firms in all size classes rates secrecy as more valuable
than patents. According to Cohen et al. (2000) a major reason for this ap-
propriation behavior of firms is the disclosure requirement linked to a patent.
In the economic literature a more differentiated view on the patenting deci-
sion itself evolves only recently: Denicolo`, Franzoni (2004) interpret a patent
as a contract between an inventor and society: An exclusive property right
is granted in exchange for the disclosure of all technological information con-
cerning the protected invention. This leads to the question whether the
monopoly benefits from patent protection are large enough to outweigh the
disutilities that arise from the disclosure requirement so that a patent is prof-
itable for the inventor. Understanding a patent as a contract leaves room for
secrecy as an alternative appropriation mechanism that comes to call when-
ever a patent would be disadvantageous.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the strategic choice of an inventor be-
tween a patent and secrecy to appropriate returns from research. In contrast
to recent work by Denicolo`, Franzoni (2004) and Bessen (2005) we explicitly
incorporate the disclosure requirement as the loss of a technological head-
start. This loss affects a patentee from the moment the patent is granted by
boosting his rival’s research. In a recent paper Erkal (2005) also considers
this effect of the disclosure requirement. To capture the idea of cumulative
innovation she assumes that firms compete in two consecutive R&D races.
The winner of the first race has a higher probability of winning the second
race than his rivals. Yet if he decides to patent his invention he loses his
1See for example Cohen et al. (2000) for a survey of manufacturing firms in the United
States and Arundel et al. (1995) for a European survey.
headstart and as a consequence all firms face the same probability of suc-
cess subsequently. Whereas Erkal (2005) focusses on the optimal policy in
the context of cumulative innovation our paper attempts to find the driving
forces behind the patenting decision itself.
To analyze the strategic patenting decision we introduce the possibility of
patenting into a dynamic model of technology adoption as provided by Dutta
et al. (1995). In their model, Dutta et al. (1995) consider continuous im-
provements of a basic invention: after a technological breakthrough a new
technology has to be further developed and adapted to market conditions.
So firms have to decide when, i. e. at which quality level to adopt a new
technology. Dutta et al. (1995) model the strategic adoption decisions of two
rival firms as a process of dynamic vertical product differentiation without
considering the possibility of patenting. One firm adopts early and mar-
kets a low quality good as the other waits for the basic invention to mature
further and markets a high quality good later. The quality of the basic in-
vention, once discovered, is assumed to rise costlessly over time. Therefore
the strategic adoption decisions have to balance the trade-off between being
temporary monopolist as first adopter and realizing higher duopoly profits
as second adopter.
In contrast to Dutta et al. (1995) we do not assume that a new technol-
ogy arrives exogenously but consider the basic invention as the outcome of
a duopolistic invention race. The successful inventor possesses the complete
technological knowledge needed to manufacture the basic invention and has
the possibility to patent this know-how. To participate in the invention race
the competing firm has also invested in research and therefore it can profit
from own research findings. Yet in the subsequent improvement competition
it has a technological disadvantage compared to the inventor. As our anal-
ysis will show it is this knowledge asymmetry between the inventor and the
non-inventor that drives the patenting decision.
The idea of introducing the possibility to patent into a model of vertical
product differentiation goes back to van Dijk (1996). In his model one of
two symmetric firms holds a patent on the basic invention without facing
any negative effect due to the disclosure requirement. The patenting decision
itself is not considered. The non-patentee may only enter the market with
a quality that is sufficiently high compared to the basic invention, namely
a quality that exceeds the exogenously given patent height. His two-stage
model setting leads van Dijk (1996) to the conclusion that the patentee faces
a
”
patent trap“ since the patent commits the non-patentee to developing
a higher quality than he would have without a patent. In equilibrium the
non-patentee will be offering the high quality product so the commitment
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effect of a patent results in higher profits for the non-patentee compared to
the patent holder. This
”
patent trap“ results due to the high-quality advan-
tage that prevails in two-stage models of vertical product differentiation.2 As
the subsequent analysis will show in a dynamic setting with asymmetric firms
the patent trap vanishes and a patent may even be profitable for the inventor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the dy-
namic model of technology adoption with asymmetric firms and analyzes
possible equilibria. In Section 3 we consider the decision between patenting
and secrecy. Section 4 investigates patent height as a possible policy measure.
Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Dynamic Quality Competition
After an initial technological breakthrough a successful inventor, i, and his ri-
val, the non-inventor j, compete in quality improvements of a basic invention.
As further research improves the quality over time the firms have to make
the strategic decision of when to adopt and market the new technology.3
We assume, as in Dutta et al. (1995) and Hoppe, Lehmann-Grube (2001),
that the level of quality, x, costlessly rises over time and without further loss
of generality that the quality level increases by one unit in every subsequent
period. The inventor’s quality improvement function is given by
ti(x) = x (1)
which states that in order to reach a certain quality level x¯ the inventor has to
invest ti(x¯) periods of time. To capture the fact that the non-inventor has a
technological disadvantage compared to the inventor his quality improvement
function is specified by
tj(x) = x+ γ (2)
with γ ≥ 0 as the extent of the technological headstart of the inventor. In
words, to reach a certain quality the non-inventor has to wait γ periods longer
than the inventor.
The first adopter of the new technology earns temporary monopoly profits as
his product of relatively low quality is the only version of the new technology
2For a detailed analysis of the persistence of the high-quality advantage see Lehmann-
Grube (1997).
3The inventor has the possibility to patent the new technology. His patenting decision
is analyzed in Section 3.
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available so far. The subsequent adoption of the rival firm constitutes an
asymmetric duopoly where the former monopolist realizes lower profits since
his rival now offers a higher quality. At the beginning of the game, t = 0, both
firms decide when, i. e. at which quality level, to adopt the new technology.
Each firm can only adopt once.
The underlying demand structure follows Shaked , Sutton (1982). Consumers
differ in their tastes θ for improvements of the basic invention. Quality
preference, θ ∈ [a, b] with b > 2a > 0, is assumed to be uniformly distributed.
Each consumer will buy one unit of the product in every period as long as
his net utility, U = θx− p, is greater than zero.
The early adopter offers a low quality xl. All consumers with a quality
preference θ ≥ pl/xl will buy one unit of the product with quality xl from
the temporary monopolist in every period until the rival firm adopts a higher
quality xh. Straightforward computation yields the monopoly profit of the
early adopter in every period
pim = Amxl
with Am ≡ b2/4. The adoption of the high quality xh by the rival firm
constitutes an asymmetric duopoly. By definition xh > xl. Then the con-
sumer indifferent between buying high or low quality is situated at θ0 =
(ph− pl)/(xh− xl), h, l = i, j ; i 6= j. The market share for the firm offering
the low quality is [a, θ0] and the high quality offered by the late adopter has
a market share of [θ0, b]. Production costs are symmetric and are assumed
to be zero.
Standard computation yields the duopoly prices
pl = (xh − xl)(b− 2a)/3 (3)
ph = (xh − xl)(2b− a)/3
and the corresponding profits per period
pih = Ah(xh − xl)
pil = Al(xh − xl)
with Ah ≡ (2b− a)2/9 and Al ≡ (b− 2a)2/9.
2.1 The Late Adopter’s Problem
A late adopter has to decide when to adopt the new technology after his rival
has already adopted a low quality xl in tl. All future profits are discounted
with the interest rate r > 0. Since with his entry into the market in th with
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a high quality xh the late adopter earns duopoly profits pih per period he
realizes lifetime profits
F (xh, xl) =
∫
∞
th(xh)
e−rtpihdt. (4)
Optimization with respect to the quality level xh yields the optimum differ-
entiation strategy given the early adopter’s quality decision, xl,
x∗h = xl +
1
r ∂th(xh)
∂xh
. (5)
As stated above the non-inventor will need γ additional periods to reach a
quality of level xh so that his entry date as late adopter would be t
h
j (xh) =
xh + γ. Due to his technological headstart the inventor would be able to
adopt this quality earlier, namely at thi (xh) = xh. Obviously in both cases
the derivative of the quality improvement function with respect to the level
of quality equals one, ∂thj (xh)/∂xh = ∂t
h
i (xh)/∂xh = 1. Thus the profit
maximizing differentiation strategy as defined in equation (5) is x∗h = xl+1/r.
Consequently the optimum level of differentiation is ∆∗x = x
∗
h − xl = 1/r,
independent of the order of adoption. The adoption date for the non-inventor
as late adopter would be thj (x
∗
h) = xl + 1/r + γ due to his technological
disadvantage. By inserting these results into the above profit function (4)
and solving the integrals the overall profits of the non-inventor as second
adopter can be derived as
Fj(xl) = e
−1−r(xl+γ)pih/r.
If the inventor is the late adopter he would optimally adopt at thi (x
∗
h) =
xl + 1/r so his overall profits would amount to
Fi(xl) = e
−1−rxlpih/r.
Note that if the inventor loses his technological headstart due to a patent,
γ = 0, both firms are symmetric and thus would realize identical profits as
second adopter, Fi(xl)
∣∣
γ=0
= Fj(xl)
∣∣
γ=0
.
2.2 The Early Adopter’s Problem
The early adopter anticipates the optimum differentiation strategy of his
rival, x∗h. His overall profit consists of two parts: the monopoly profits he
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realizes from his adoption in tl until the second firm enters in th and the
subsequent duopoly profits,
L(xl) =
∫ th(x∗h)
tl(xl)
e−rtpim dt+
∫
∞
th(x
∗
h
)
e−rtpil dt. (6)
Taking into account the optimum level of differentiation, ∆∗x = 1/r and
∂th(x
∗
h)/∂xl = 1, optimization with respect to xl yields the profit maximizing
adoption quality for the first adopter
x∗l =
1− e−r(th(x∗h)−tl)(1 + Al/Am)
r(1− e−r(th(x∗h)−tl)) . (7)
Two different cases may occur: the inventor or the non-inventor can be the
early adopter. Suppose that the non-inventor j adopts first. Due to his
technological disadvantage he needs more time to reach the quality level xl.
Thus as early adopter he would enter the market in tlj(xl) = xl + γ and the
inventor as second adopter would follow in thi (xl) = xl + 1/r. To assure that
tlj(xl) < t
h
i (xl) let γ < 1/r. Inserting these adoption dates into equation (6)
and solving the integrals yields the overall profits of the non-inventor as early
adopter
Lj(xl) =
(e−rγ − e−1)pim + e−1 pil
erxlr
.
Since the non-inventor faces a technological disadvantage he is able to realize
positive profits only after γ periods of time have elapsed so that Lj(xl) >
0 ∀ t > γ and Lj(xl) = 0 ∀ xl ≤ γ. If the non-inventor is the early adopter
his profit maximizing early adoption quality x∗lj can be derived by inserting
thi (x
∗
h) and t
l
j(xl) into equation (7),
x∗lj =
1− e−1+rγ(1 + Al/Am)
r(1− e−1+rγ) . (8)
The case is different if the inventor is the first adopter. He would opti-
mally adopt the basic invention in tli(xl) = xl and the non-inventor as second
adopter would follow in thj (xl) = xl + 1/r + γ. Inserting these relations into
the profit function (6) and solving the integrals yields the overall profit of
the inventor as early adopter
Li(xl) =
(1− e−1−rγ)pim + e−1−rγ pil
erxl r
(9)
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with the corresponding profit maximizing quality level
x∗li =
1− e−1−rγ(1 + Al/Am)
r(1− e−1−rγ) . (10)
Note that again firms are symmetric if γ = 0 due to a patent and thus as
early adopters they would choose similar quality levels, x∗li
∣∣
γ=0
= x∗lj
∣∣
γ=0
and
realize identical profits, Li(xl)
∣∣
γ=0
= Lj(xl)
∣∣
γ=0
. For all γ > 0 the profit
maximizing quality level of the inventor exceeds that of the non-inventor,
x∗li > x
∗
lj, as obviously ∂x
∗
li/∂γ > 0 and ∂x
∗
lj/∂γ < 0.
2.3 Equilibria
In the previous section the overall profit functions solely depending on the
adoption quality of the first adopter, Li(xl), Lj(xl), Fi(xl) and Fj(xl) were
derived. Note that the asymmetric adoption capabilities of the firms were
taken into account by inserting the specific quality improvement functions
ti(x) and tj(x) as specified in equations (1) and (2). Therefore the quality
level, xl, that the profits are now dependent on, is equivalent to time, xl = t.
Figure 1 depicts these profit functions for two alternative values of the tech-
nological headstart where the solid lines are the overall profits of the inventor
and the dotted lines represent the non-inventor’s alternative profits.
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(a) Preemption, γ = 1/2
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(b) Maturation, γ = 6/5
Figure 1: Nash Equilibria for different values of the technological headstart, xN
depicts the equilibrium low quality, with a = 2, b = 5, r = 0.5
If the headstart of the inventor is small, as in Figure 1(a), both firms prefer
to be the first adopter with quality x∗lk, k = i, j, as this would maximize their
overall profits Lk(x
∗
lk), k = i, j. Since both anticipate that the other will
follow this adoption strategy no one is able to realize his profit maximizing
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quality level. Suppose the inventor i intends to adopt quality x∗li then the non-
inventor, j, anticipating this, would adopt at x∗li − ² since this yields higher
profits, Lj(x
∗
li − ²) > Fj(x∗li). Now the inventor in turn has an incentive to
preempt and so on. Following this argument preemption is the dominant
strategy for both firms as long as Lk(x
∗
lk) > Fk(x
∗
lk), k = i, j.
Evidently either firm will stop preempting as soon as it reaches the adoption
quality at which early and late adoption yield the same profits, the inter-
section point xIk with Lk(x
I
k) = Fk(x
I
k), k = i, j. Therefore the loser of a
preemption race will be the firm that reaches its intersection point first when
moving backwards from x∗lk, k = i, j.
Lemma 1 The inventor will always be the first adopter if both firms follow
a preemption strategy.
Proof: The intersection point for the non-inventor can be derived by equat-
ing his alternative profits, Fj(x
I
j) = Lj(x
I
j ). Rearranging terms yields
xIj =
e−rγAh − Al
erAm(e−rγ − e−1) . (11)
Analogously the intersection point for the inventor can be derived as xIi =
(Ah − e−rγAl)/(erAm(1 − e−1−rγ)). As both firms are symmetric whenever
γ = 0, xIi has to be equal to x
I
j if there is no technological headstart. As ob-
viously ∂xIj/∂γ > 0 and ∂x
I
i /∂γ < 0 it is always true that x
I
i < x
I
j for γ > 0.
Consequently if both firms follow a preemptive strategy the non-inventor
reaches his intersection point first and thus always loses the preemption race.
¥
Thus if the technological headstart is low as in Figure 1(a) the inventor will
always win the preemption race by adopting the quality xIj . The non-inventor
has no incentive to preempt this quality as in this case he realizes higher prof-
its as second adopter, Lj(x
I
j − ²) < Fj(xIj ).
In the case of a high technological headstart as depicted in Figure 1(b) the
non-inventor has no incentive to preempt his rival at all since Fj(x
∗
lj) ≥
Lj(x
∗
lj). It can be shown that opposing to the change of strategies of the non-
inventor from preemption to maturation the inventor’s dominant adoption
strategy does not change as the technological headstart rises.
Lemma 2 If the technological headstart rises the non-inventor’s dominant
strategy changes from preemption to maturation while the inventor’s domi-
nant strategy always is preemption.
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Proof: The preemption-conditions for the firms can be derived by inserting
their profit maximizing quality levels x∗lk, k = i, j as stated in equations (8)
and (10) into Lk(x
∗
lk) > Fk(x
∗
lk), k = i, j. Solving for γ yields the critical
condition for the technological headstart. For the non-inventor it is
γ <
1
r
ln
[
e− Ah
Am
]
≡ γp. (12)
If and only if γp > 0 both strategies, preemption and maturation, exist for the
non-inventor. Preemption prevails whenever γ < γp and as the technological
headstart rises above γp the dominant adoption strategy of the non-inventor
changes to maturation. Rearranging γp > 0 yields a critical condition for
consumer diversity4
a
b
> 2− 3
2
√
e− 1. (13)
Solving the preemption condition for the inventor, Li(x
∗
li) > Fi(x
∗
li), for γ
results in γ > ln[e− 4
9
(2− a
b
)2]/(−r). Due to condition (13), the right hand
side of this inequality is always negative so the preemption-condition for the
inventor is fulfilled for all γ ≥ 0. ¥
According to Lemma 2 whenever γ ≥ γp maturation is the dominant strategy
of the non-inventor while the inventor follows a preemptive strategy trying
to realize x∗li. Following his dominant strategy the non-inventor either lets
the quality of the basic invention mature up to the point in time where he
can reach his profit maximizing quality, x∗lj, realizing overall profits Lj(x
∗
lj)
or he waits until the inventor enters with his profit maximizing quality x∗li.
By entering as second adopter he then would realize overall profits Fj(x
∗
li).
The actual maturation strategy of the non-inventor thus depends on the
respective height of the profits that he can realize.
Lemma 3 If the technological headstart is very high, the non-inventor prefers
to be second adopter and waits until the inventor adopts his profit maximizing
quality x∗li.
Proof: Rearranging Fj(x
∗
li) ≥ Lj(x∗lj) yields the implicit solution for the
critical height of the technological headstart γ,
γ ≥ 1
r
ln
[
e− Ah
Am
e−r(x
∗
li
−x∗
lj
)
]
≡ γm. (14)
4Note that this condition corresponds to the preemption-condition for symmetric firms
as stated by Dutta et al. (1995).
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As e−r(x
∗
li
−x∗
lj
) < 1 it is always true that γm > γp. Since for all γ > γp the
non-inventor follows a maturation strategy he will choose between the two
possible strategies wait until x∗lj if γ < γ
m since then Fj(x
∗
li) < Lj(x
∗
lj) and
wait until x∗li if γ ≥ γm since then Fj(x∗li) ≥ Lj(x∗lj). ¥
Obviously Figure 1(b) depicts a situation where the non-inventor realizes
higher profits by leaving the first move to the inventor than by adopting first
himself as here evidently Fj(x
∗
li) ≥ Lj(x∗lj) holds.
With the results stated in Lemmata 1 to 3 the unique and stable subgame
perfect Nash equilibria of this game of dynamic quality competition can be
derived. An equilibrium in which both firms preempt each other is defined
as a preemption equilibrium while an equilibrium where at least one firm lets
the basic invention mature up to a certain quality is defined as a maturation
equilibrium. Note that these Nash equilibria exist if and only if the market
is completely covered.
Proposition 1 This dynamic game of quality competition with asymmetric
firms has three unique subgame perfect Nash Equilibria given that consumer
diversity is sufficiently wide:
i) a preemption equilibrium with xpi = x
I
j and x
p
j = x
I
j +
1
r
whenever
γ < γp,
ii) a maturation I equilibrium with xmIi = x
∗
lj − ² and xmIj = x∗lj − ² + 1r
whenever γp ≤ γ < γm,
iii) a maturation II equilibrium with xmIIi = x
∗
li and x
mII
j = x
∗
li+
1
r
whenever
γm ≤ γ
with γp = 1
r
ln
[
e− Ah
Am
]
and γm = 1
r
ln
[
e− Ah
Am
e−r(x
∗
li
−x∗
lj
)
]
.
Proof: i) preemption equilibrium - From Lemmata 1 and 2 we know that if
γ < γp both firms follow a preemption strategy and that in this case the in-
ventor will always win the preemption race. Thus in equilibrium the inventor
markets the quality xpi = x
I
j whereas the non-inventor optimally differenti-
ates as stated in equation (5) and adopts the quality xpj = x
I
j + 1/r.
ii) maturation I equilibrium - As stated in Lemma 3 the non-inventor’s adop-
tion strategy changes from preemption to maturation for γ ≥ γp. Then two
possible strategies may prevail as analyzed in Lemma 3. Whenever γ < γm
the non-inventor aims at being the first adopter with the quality x∗lj. The
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inventor anticipates this behavior and, as he always follows a preemption
strategy, he preempts his rival by adopting a quality just marginally below,
xmIi = x
∗
lj−². The non-inventor has no incentive to deviate from his optimum
differentiation level as second adopter, xmIj = x
∗
lj − ²+1/r, since preempting
the inventor would yield lower profits, Lj(x
∗
lj − 2²) < Fj(x∗lj − ²), as well
as adopting a slightly higher quality would yield lower profits, Lj(x
∗
lj) <
Fj(x
∗
lj − ²).
iii) maturation II equilibrium - According to Lemma 3 whenever γ ≥ γm the
non-inventor aims at being the second adopter and waits until the inventor
adopts his profit maximizing quality x∗li since Fj(x
∗
li) ≥ Lj(x∗lj). In this case
the inventor is able to reach his profit maximizing quality level xmIIi = x
∗
li
and the non-inventor optimally differentiates by choosing xmIIj = x
∗
li + 1/r.
¥
To assure that the market for differentiated quality goods is completely cov-
ered for these equilibria the consumer with the lowest taste parameter has to
realize a positive net utility from buying the low quality good, axl − p l ≥ 0.
Inserting p l as stated in equation (3) and rearranging yields
xl ≥ 1− 2c
3cr
(15)
with c ≡ a/b. In the respective equilibria the low quality takes the values
xl = {xIj , x∗lj−², x∗li}. As ∂xIj/∂γ > 0 and ∂x∗li/∂γ > 0 if the market coverage
condition holds for the respective minimum values xIj
∣∣
γ=0
and x∗li
∣∣
γ=0
it is
always fulfilled for all values with γ > 0. Substituting xIj
∣∣
γ=0
into the critical
condition (15) and rearranging terms leads to the restriction that consumer
diversity has to exceed a critical level, c ≥ 0.2382, for the market to be
covered. Substituting x∗li
∣∣
γ=0
into the market coverage condition as stated in
equation (15) yields the critical level for consumer diversity, c > 0.2108.
The case is different for xl = x
∗
lj − ² since ∂x∗lj/∂γ < 0. Inserting xl = x∗lj − ²
into equation (15) solving for γ and letting ²→ 0 yields
γ <
1
r
ln
[
3e(5c− 1)
19c− 3− 16c2(1− c)
]
≡ γ˜.
Note that for c > 0.2108 it is always true that γ˜ > γp. Thus a maturation I
equilibrium with xl = x
∗
lj − ² can exist whenever the market coverage condi-
tion for a maturation II equilibrium is fulfilled. Consequently, if c > 0.2382
all three unique Nash equilibria exist.
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3 The patenting decision
An incentive to patent exists in every situation where the inventor is not able
to adopt his profit maximizing quality level, x∗li. As the precedent analysis
showed this is the case in a preemption equilibrium and in a maturation I
equilibrium. Thus xSi = {xpi , xmIi } describes all secrecy equilibrium qualities
that induce an incentive to patent. If the inventor patents his basic invention
the non-inventor is deterred from adopting the new technology up to a certain
quality level that is characterized by the height of the patent5, φ ∈ ]xSi , x∗li].
Consequently a patent enables the inventor to choose a higher quality level
than with secrecy, φ > xSi . As ∂Li/∂xi > 0 for x < x
∗
li, the inventor will
always profit from this protective effect of a patent. Note that in case of
a patent the choice variables of the firms carry the superscript φ. With a
patent the inventor will adopt the quality that corresponds to the height of
the patent, xφi = φ since this maximizes his profits.
The protective effect of a patent is determined by the increase of the inventor’s
profit resulting from the possibility of adopting a higher quality than without
a patent, φ > xSi ,
∆+ = Li(φ)|γ>0 − Li(xSi )|γ>0. (16)
This positive protective effect is opposed by the negative effect arising from
the disclosure requirement of a patent. Understanding a patent in the sense
of Denicolo`, Franzoni (2004) as a contract between the inventor and soci-
ety, the inventor is granted an exclusive property right in exchange for the
disclosure of all technological information concerning the protected inven-
tion. By the required disclosure the inventor loses his initial technological
headstart, γ = 0. Consequently, as the non-inventor is now able to enter at
an earlier point in time, tφj (x) = x, instead of t
S
j (x) = x + γ, the duration
of the monopoly of the patent holder is narrowed. This negative patenting
effect corresponds to the difference between the profit of the inventor when a
positive technological headstart exists, γ > 0, and his profit when both firms
face symmetric adoption abilities6, γ = 0,
∆− = Li(φ)|γ>0 − Li(φ)|γ=0. (17)
5To my knowledge van Dijk (1996) was the first to use this term to describe the quality
range that is protected by a patent. Note that patent height does not necessarily corre-
spond to the length of a patent. To isolate the strategic effect of patent height the length
of a patent, τφ, is assumed to be greater than the time that is necessary to develop a
quality that lies outside the protected quality range, τφ > t(φ+ ²).
6Changing this assumption to capture the fact that a patent might not lead to a total
disclosure does not change the qualitative results of the subsequent analysis. Actually
γ > 0 in spite of a patent would lead to a higher critical level of the technological headstart
as defined in Proposition 2.
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Combining the protective and the disclosure effect yields the overall effect
that patenting has on the profit of the inventor, ∆φ = ∆
+ −∆−. Inserting
equations (16) and (17) this patent effect can be derived as
∆φ = Li(φ)|γ=0 − Li(xSi )|γ>0.
Whenever ∆φ is positive the protective effect overcompensates the disclosure
effect so that the inventor has an incentive to patent since this increases his
overall profits. Inserting the profit function Li(·) as defined in equation (9)
and taking into account that ∆φ is additively separable into the alternation
a patent causes in the temporary monopoly and the alternation it causes in
the subsequent duopoly yields
∆φ = ∆M +∆D (18)
with
∆M ≡ Am((e−rt
φ
i − e−rtφj )φ− (e−rtSi − e−rtSj )xSi )/r (19)
∆D ≡ Al(e−rt
φ
j − e−rtSj )/r2. (20)
While the adoption date of the non-inventor in an equilibrium with secrecy,
tSj , is dependent on the extent of the technological headstart, in case of a
patent it is dependent on patent height with ∂tφj /∂φ > 0. Obviously, if
patent height is chosen so that the adoption date of the non-inventor is the
same with and without a patent tφj = t
S
j , namely φ = x
S
i + γ, the overall
patent effect solely consists of the patent effect in monopoly, ∆φ = ∆M .
Additionally using the established equilibrium interrelations tφj = t
φ
i + 1/r
and tSj = t
S
i + 1/r + γ equation (18) can be rewritten as
∆φ
∣∣
tφj=t
S
j
=
Am ((e− 1)φ− (e1+rγ − 1)xSi )
ert
S
j r
. (21)
With this functional form of the overall patent effect it is possible to derive
a critical level for the technological headstart that determines whether the
inventor patents his basic invention or not. Recall that this dynamic game
of technology adoption has three unique equilibria if patents are absent: a
preemption equilibrium and two maturation equilibria. As one would expect
the patenting behavior is different in the respective cases.
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Proposition 2 In this dynamic game of technology adoption the decision
between patenting and keeping the basic invention secret crucially depends on
the extent of the technological headstart of the inventor:
i) in a preemption equilibrium the inventor will patent his basic invention
whenever γ ≤ γpφ.
ii) in a maturation I equilibrium the inventor will patent his basic invention
whenever γ > γmφ .
iii) in a maturation II equilibrium the inventor will never patent.
Where
γpφ ≡
1
r
ln
[
1
2eAl
(α0 −
√
α20 − 4eAl(Ah + Am(e− 1)reφ))
]
(22)
γmφ ≡
1
r
ln
[
1
2eα2
(α1 +
√
α21 − 4e2α2Am(1 + (e− 1)rφ))
]
(23)
with α0 ≡ Al + eAh + Am(e − 1)rφ, α1 ≡ Al + Am(1 + e2 + (e − 1)rφ) and
α2 ≡ Al + Am.
Proof: i) preemption equilibrium - The inventor will patent whenever
∆φ
∣∣
tφj=t
S
j
≥ 0. Solving for γ and rearranging terms yields γ ≤ γpφ as stated
in equation (22). A preemption equilibrium requires γ < γp (Proposition
1) so that if γpφ < γ
p holds, patenting and secrecy may occur. Obviously
∂∆φ
∣∣
tφj=t
S
j
/∂φ > 0 and consequently ∂γpφ/∂φ > 0. Then a function Ω
p ≡
γp − γpφ > 0 must be monotonically decreasing in φ reaching its minimum
when patent height φ reaches its maximum. Inserting φ = x∗li into Ω
p(·) > 0
and rearranging terms yields
a
b
> 2− 3
2
√
e− 1
which is equal to the necessary condition for a preemption equilibrium as
stated in equation (13). So for all φ < x∗li it is true that γ
p
φ < γ
p.
If tφj > t
S
j (t
φ
j < t
S
j ) the inventor patents more (less) whenever φ > Al/(Amr)
since then ∂∆φ/∂t
φ
j > 0. If φ < Al/(Amr) the inventor patents less (more) if
tφj > t
S
j (t
φ
j < t
S
j ) since in this case ∂∆φ/∂t
φ
j < 0.
ii) maturation I equilibrium - Solving ∆φ
∣∣
tφj=t
S
j
> 0 for γ and rearranging
terms yields γ > γmφ as stated in equation (23). A maturation I equilibrium
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requires γm > γ ≥ γp (Proposition 1) so that if γmφ ≶ γm and γmφ > γp hold,
patenting and secrecy may occur. Note that ∂γm/∂γ > 0 so that γm reaches
its maximum as γ approaches its upper limit, limγ→1/r γ
m = 1/r, while γmφ <
1/r remains unchanged. Thus γm
∣∣
γ→1/r
≥ γmφ must be true for large values
of the technological headstart. In this case patenting (γ > γmφ ) and secrecy
(γ ≤ γmφ ) may occur in a maturation I equilibrium. If on the other hand γ
approaches its lower bound, limγ→0 γ
m = γp so that it is sufficient to show
that γmφ > γ
p. In this case secrecy prevails in a maturation I equilibrium.
Define Ωm ≡ γmφ − γp. As ∂Ωm/∂φ = ∂γmφ /∂φ > 0 the minimum of the
function Ωm(·) is reached when φ = 0. It can be shown that Ωm∣∣
φ=0
> 0 so
that for all φ > 0 it must be true that Ωm > 0 and thus γmφ > γ
p (= γm
∣∣
γ→0
).
In this case the inventor will never patent in a maturation I equilibrium.
For tφj 6= tSj patenting behavior varies in the same way as stated for the pre-
emption case i) above.
iii) maturation II equilibrium - In a maturation II equilibrium the inventor
realizes xmIIi = x
∗
li so that the protective effect of a patent as stated in equa-
tion (16) is smaller than or equal to zero. Consequently, the overall patenting
effect can never be positive so the inventor never patents in a maturation II
equilibrium. ¥
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate7 these results for φ = x∗li and t
φ
j = t
S
j . As stated in
Proposition 1 this game of technology adoption has a preemption equilibrium
whenever γ < γp which means that all parameter constellations below the
γp−curve in Figure 2 lead to an adoption quality xpi = xIj of the inventor if
the basic invention is not patented. As ∆φ
∣∣
tφj=t
S
j
= ∆M the γ
p
φ−curve defines
all combinations of a/b and γ for which the protective and the disclosure
effect compensate each other and thus the patent effect equals zero. Clearly
this curve lies within the area that constitutes a preemption equilibrium so
that the patenting decision depends on the extent of the technological head-
start. If the technological headstart is small the protective effect dominates
the disclosure effect and the inventor profits from patenting his basic inven-
tion. This is the case in the hatched area of Figure 2. In the extreme case of
γ = 0 the inventor will always patent his invention in a preemption equilib-
rium since this protects him from a preemptive adoption by his competitor
with the disclosure effect being absent. If the technological headstart exceeds
the critical value γpφ, as is the case between the γ
p
φ−curve and the γp−curve,
7Note that for figures 2 and 3 the range of consumer diversity, a/b, is chosen such that
market coverage and thus the existence of all three unique Nash equilibria is ensured.
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Figure 2: Patenting behavior in a preemption equilibrium, r = 0.5
the disclosure effect outweighs the protective effect and the inventor prefers
to keep his invention secret.
Figure 3 shows the critical values of the technological headstart concerning
the patenting decision in the maturation equilibria. Recall that γm represents
an implicit solution to the maturation condition Fj(x
∗
li) ≥ Lj(x∗lj) (Lemma 3)
so naturally the appearance of the γm−curve varies with different γ−values:
Each γm−curve is only valid for one particular value of the technological
headstart which is represented by a horizontal dotted line in Figure 3. The
two values γ = 0.85 and γ¯ = 1.95 are chosen to illustrate all possible cases
stated in Proposition 2 ii) and iii). If the technological headstart is rather
small, γ = 0.85, and consumer diversity is relatively large (areas I and II)
then γ is greater than γm
∣∣
γ
so that a maturation II equilibrium prevails in
which the inventor never patents. As consumer diversity becomes smaller
(a/b rises) γm
∣∣
γ
rises so that γ is now smaller than the critical value γm
∣∣
γ
.
Consequently in area III the necessary condition for a maturation I equi-
librium, γm
∣∣
γ
> γ ≥ γp, holds. Recall that the γmφ −curve represents all
parameter values for which the protective and the disclosure effect exactly
compensate each other so that the patent effect is zero. If γ moves below
(above) the γmφ −curve the protective effect decreases (increases) more than
the disclosure effect as ∂∆+/∂γ > ∂∆−/∂γ. Consequently, as γ < γmφ the
17
0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
1
2
γ
a
b
γm
∣∣
γ=0.85
γm
∣∣
γ¯=1.95
γmφ
γp
γpφ
I II III IV
Figure 3: Patenting behavior in the maturation equilibria, r = 0.5
inventor refrains from patenting in the maturation I equilibrium in area III
since the protective effect is outweighed by the disclosure effect. For a very
narrow diversity of consumers (area IV) γ is even smaller than γp so that a
preemption equilibrium prevails.
The case is different if the technological headstart is high. As γ¯ = 1.95,
represented by the upper dotted horizontal line, is greater than γp for all
values of consumer diversity, a/b, a preemption equilibrium never occurs. If
consumer diversity is large (area I) γ¯ fulfills the condition for a maturation I
equilibrium as γm > γ¯ ≥ γp. Since additionally γ¯ lies in the parameter area
where the protective effect of a patent exceeds its disclosure effect, γ¯ > γmφ ,
the inventor will patent his basic invention in area I. As consumer diversity
becomes smaller (areas II-IV) the critical height of the technological head-
start γm
∣∣
γ¯
decreases so that the condition for a maturation II equilibrium,
γ¯ > γm
∣∣
γ¯
, is fulfilled. Since in this case the inventor can realize his profit
maximizing quality x∗li he will not patent his basic invention in areas II-IV.
As the preceding observations show, the technological headstart as well as
the diversity of consumers are decisive for the strategic decision between
a patent and secrecy. The central results are twofold: if secrecy leads to
a preemption equilibrium then a higher technological headstart leads to an
intensive increase of the disclosure effect so that the inventor refrains from
patenting for high values of γ. If secrecy leads to a maturation I equilibrium
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then a higher technological advantage leads to a boost of the protective effect
so that it even overcompensates a relatively high disclosure effect. In this
case the inventor patents his basic invention for high values of γ.
4 Patenting and Welfare
The analysis of the patenting decision of an inventor leaves the question
whether a patent is socially desirable or not. As the height of a patent
is left to policy decisions, investigating this question might lead to careful
implications on the design of this parameter. Naturally, a first step has to
be the determination of a social welfare function in the underlying model of
dynamic technology adoption. In the subsequent welfare considerations only
the preemption case with the inventor as early adopter will be considered.
Recall that this means that the inventor will enter the market as monopolist
in tl adopting the product at a low quality whereas the non-inventor enters
at th adopting a high quality. This unambiguousness allows us to drop the
subscripts i and j. Consumers thus face monopoly and subsequently duopoly
so that consumer surplus amounts to
CS =
∫ th
tl
e−rt
∫ b
pm/xl
(θxl − pm) dθ dt
+
∫
∞
th
e−rt
(∫ θ0
a
(θxl − pl) dθ +
∫ b
θ0
(θxh − ph) dθ
)
dt
where the first summand depicts the consumer’s surplus during monopoly and
the second summand their surplus during duopoly. The producer’s surplus
consisting of the overall profits of the two firms over time equals
PS =
∫ th
tl
e−rtpimdt+
∫
∞
th
e−rt(pil + pih) dt.
Inserting equilibrium prices, quality levels and profits derived in the previous
sections, solving the integrals, summing up and collecting terms yields the
social welfare function
W =
1
8 r
[ 3 b2 e−rtl + (b2 − 4a2) e−rth ]. (24)
The derivatives of this function with respect to the adoption dates th and tl
are both negative so that an early date of the first technology adoption as
well as a small level of differentiation are socially desirable. As stated in the
following Proposition a patent may be welfare enhancing although it delays
the date of the first adoption.
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Proposition 3 Patenting the basic invention increases (decreases) social
welfare if a technological headstart exists, γ > 0, and φ < φW (φ ≥ φW).
Where
φW = xI + γ − 1
r
ln
[
4a2 − b2(1 + 3e1+rγ)
4a2 − b2(1 + 3e)
]
.
In the absence of a technological headstart, γ = 0, a patent is welfare de-
creasing.
Proof: If the inventor decides to patent, his date of adoption depends on
the height of the patent, tφi = φ, as does the adoption date of the non-
inventor, tφj = φ+ 1/r. Substituting these adoption dates into equation (24)
yields Wφ = [ 3 b2 e−rφ + (b2 − 4a2) e−r(φ+1/r)]/(8 r). If the inventor refrains
from patenting his adoption strategy is tSi = x
I and the non-inventor reacts
by adopting in tSj = x
I + 1/r + γ. Substituting these adoption times into
equation (24) results in the welfare realized when the basic invention is not
patented, WS = [ 3 b2 e−rx
I
+ (b2 − 4a2) e−r(xI+1/r+γ)]/(8 r). Then the effect
patenting has on social welfare amounts to ∆Wφ = W
φ −W S. Inserting W φ
and W S as derived above and rearranging terms yields
∆Wφ = 3 b
2(e−rφ − e−rxI ) + (b2 − 4a2)(e−1−rφ − e−r(xI+1/r+γ)). (25)
This patent effect on welfare is zero, ∆Wφ = 0, for a patent height of φ
W as
stated in the above Proposition. In the absence of a technological headstart,
γ = 0, this critical patent height is φW = xI . A patent of this height would
have no protective effect at all so the inventor would never patent. There-
fore minimum patent height must be φmin = xI + ². Since ∂∆Wφ /∂φ < 0
the patent effect on social welfare will be positive for all patent heights with
φ < φW. As ∂φW/∂γ > 0, an increase of the technological headstart would
raise the critical level of the patent height that induces a welfare effect of
zero, φW. Thus for all γ > 0 there is a multitude of possible patent heights
φ ∈ [xI+², φW[ that offer a protective effect and enhance social welfare. ¥
Recalling Proposition 2 and the fact that the inventor may refrain from
patenting if his technological headstart exceeds a critical level γpφ, it is cru-
cial to investigate whether patents actually occur for patent heights that are
welfare enhancing. Note that φW as stated in the above Proposition 3 always
exceeds xI + γ since the term in square brackets is smaller than one so that
the logarithm always has a negative value. Then φ¯ = xI + γ < φW is a wel-
fare enhancing patent height. As stated in Section 3 the inventor will patent
as long as the overall effect of patenting, ∆φ, as stated in equation (18), is
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positive. Note that φ¯ = xI+γ may lead to both cases, patenting and secrecy,
depending on the extent of the technological headstart (see Proposition 2).
Consequently patent height is indeed a tractable measure to induce a welfare
enhancement. But adjusting patent height for welfare reasons is a very com-
plex matter - not only the counter effects of a patent on social welfare have to
be considered but also the effects on the inventor’s patenting decision: The
attempt to enhance social welfare by decreasing patent height may lead to a
situation where the inventor completely refrains from patenting.
5 Conclusions
This paper has examined the patenting decision of a successful inventor. In
understanding a patent as a contract between an inventor and society (Deni-
colo`, Franzoni (2004)) we divided the effect a patent has on the profits of an
inventor into two parts, a protective and a disclosure effect. The literature so
far mostly assumes that a disclosure effect applies only after a patent expires.
Before this date the disclosure requirement has no negative consequences for
the patentee. We extend this view to include the realistic case that the dis-
closure requirement affects the patentee from the moment a patent is granted
as he loses a technological headstart.
The main contribution of this paper is that we derive a critical level of asym-
metry between the firms, i. e. extent of a technological headstart, as the
decisive factor concerning the patenting behavior of a successful inventor.
Building on Dutta et al. (1995) the patenting decision was endogenized in a
dynamic model of technology adoption. This game has three unique Nash
equilibria, preemption and maturation I and II. The patenting behavior dif-
fers in all cases. If both firms follow preemptive strategies in improving the
basic invention, a patent will only benefit the inventor if his headstart does
not exceed a critical level. If the technological headstart is higher, the dis-
closure effect of a patent absorbs its positive protective effect completely - a
patent would decrease the profits of the patentee so that he prefers secrecy.
In a maturation II equilibrium this is always the case. If secrecy leads to a
maturation I equilibrium then a higher technological headstart leads to such
an increase of the protective effect that it even overcompensates a relatively
high disclosure effect. In this case the inventor patents his basic innovation
if γ exceeds a critical value.
Weakening patent protection by decreasing a patent’s height may have pos-
itive welfare effects. But possibly a decrease of patent height may have a
negative influence on the patenting decision of the inventor. If he refrains
21
from patenting due to the lower patent height a policy attempt would be in
vain. Thus any policy implications have to be considered with great care
cautiously taking into account specific market conditions.
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